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The Inevitability of Theory
Richard Lempert†
INTRODUCTION
I wrote this Article in response to an invitation to deliver the keynote
address at Berkeley Law School’s Jurisprudence and Social Policy conference
―Building Theory Through Empirical Legal Studies.‖ Lauren Edelman, the
intellectual mother of the conference, gently brushed aside my suggestion that I
present one of my own attempts to synthesize the results of empirical research
to generate theory, and asked that I directly address the conference topic. I am
glad that she did.
The first question the conference theme raised for me was what should
empirical legal scholars1 be theorizing? My answer is almost everything law
related. The empirical legal studies (ELS) realm includes empirically
examining and building theory to explain: extralegal forces that shape legal
decision making,2 people’s relations to particular laws3 and to law in general,4
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the author are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
† Richard Lempert is the University of Michigan’s Eric Stein Distinguished University
Professor of Law and Sociology, emeritus. He is currently serving as the Chief Scientist and Basic
Research Lead in the Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division of the Science and
Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. Opinions, factual assertions and
other statements in this Article are attributable solely to Professor Lempert and are not those of the
Department of Homeland Security.
1. For the most part, I shall use the terms ―empirical legal,‖ ―ELS,‖ and ―sociolegal‖ to
refer not just to the scholars and scholarship associated with the empirical legal studies movement
in American law schools but to empirically based sociolegal scholarship whatever the academic
background or affiliation of the researcher. This is not only because most of what I will say
applies generally to all empirically oriented students of legal phenomena but also because a
number of those who participate in the annual ELS conference or who publish or seek to publish
in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies have no law school affiliation. Where I mean to refer
largely or only to ELS scholars and scholarship as an American law school phenomenon, the
context should make this clear.
2. These forces include political values, racial biases, economic self-interest, and other
characteristics and commitments that can influence the decisions of judges, juries, and
administrative agencies as well as other exercises of legal discretion. See, e.g., Stephanie
Lindquist & Pamela Corley, The Strategies of Judicial Review (2009) (on file with the California
Law Review).
3. An individual’s social position and personality will influence how a person interprets, is
affected by, and responds to particular laws. See, e.g.,
,
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the public’s use of and its treatment by the legal system,5 the activities of law
enforcement agencies,6 the effects of law and its enforcement,7 law’s influence
on the rules and practices of other social institutions,8 and the behavior of legal
institutions such as courts, juries, and administrative agencies,9 to name just a
few targets of sociolegal scholarly attention.
Theory is not always central to this work. Many ELS papers, including
some of the most valuable, make their contribution primarily through data

(2004).
4. Individuals differ in how they conceive of the law and the legal system and what these
imply for their own activities and social relationships. See, e.g.,
,
:
(1998).
5. People and organizations differ in the uses to which they put law, their readiness to
invoke legal norms and remedies, and in their reactions to attempts to use the law against them.
See, e.g.,
,
(1994);
,
(1974); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
95 (1974); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
55
(1963).
6. Legal norms and organizational and ideological variables shape law enforcement
routines. See, e.g.,
,
(2008);
,
(1984);
,
(3d ed. 1994).
7. Researchers seek to discern whether a law has its apparently intended effects and to
identify and understand the mechanisms that mediate the effects of legal commands. See, e.g.,
,
(2d
ed. 2008);
,
(1992); Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the
World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32
237 (2007); Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury
Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1
151 (2005).
8. Private organizations like businesses and universities often adopt and transform
principles like due process that have been first defined by the legal system. See, e.g.,
,
(2009); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97
1531–76
(1992); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion
of Due Process in the Workplace, 95
1401–40 (1990); Lauren B. Edelman,
Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Rights in
the Workplace, 27
497–534 (1993); Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen
& Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth, 105
406–454 (1999).
9. Many sociolegal scholars have offered in-depth portraits of specific legal institutions
with special attention to the forces that shape them and how they go about their business. See, e.g.,
,
(1977);
,
(2002);
,
(1969);
,
,
(1991);
,
(1949);
,
(2007).
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collection, organization and description.10 But even largely descriptive papers
usually conclude with a bow to theory and an attempt to explain or theorize
what has been found. The only area of the law where ELS scholars11 seldom
venture, and are, for the most part, content to leave the theory building to
others, is the interpretation of legal doctrine.12 This is the enterprise that
involves culling statutes, cases, historical records, and other sources to advance
a general theory of what cases and statutes mean and/or how the law should be
changed or amended.13 This doctrine-centered approach to understanding law
and building legal theory broadly characterizes most legal scholarship.
Although it is not the kind of theory building that ELS scholars engage in, it
nonetheless has an important empirical component. As I once observed on the
ELS blog site:
The most traditional lawyers work with empirical data all the time—
case texts. Texts are out there as part of the real world, and from the
point of view of empirical scholarship have some substantial virtues.
In particular they are transparent (even when opaque), equally
accessible to all scholars and open to various methods of
interpretation, some of which are better than others. They also often
matter. Would that the data ―legal empiricists‖ examined always had
10. The work of Theodore Eisenberg is outstanding in this respect. See, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6
. 111 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg, Use it or Pretenders Will Abuse It: The
Importance of Archival Legal Information, 75
. 1 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg et
al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3
. 263 (2006). For other fine
examples, see Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making
Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982
543 (1982); Samuel R. Gross
& Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
1 (1996).
11. When I refer to ELS scholars I usually mean to include empirically oriented sociolegal
scholars of all disciplinary backgrounds. See supra note 1. Many of the latter will see the Law &
Society Association (―L&SA‖) as their primary associational home, but there is increasing overlap
between the attendees at the ELS and L&SA annual meetings and among those who seek to
publish in the flagship journals of these two associations. To the extent there are differences in
their scholarly style, L&SA members are more likely than those primarily identified with ELS to
be concerned with how their work is rooted in and contributes to social theory.
12. ELS scholars are not, however, reluctant to test or challenge understandings of what the
law means with empirical data. See, e.g., Daniel Ho, Kevin Quinn & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal
Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–
2006, 62
591 (2010). Hybrid articles in which the writer begins as a law professor,
analyzing cases and interpreting their meaning, then switches to ELS mode and collects data
bearing in some way on the law or its effects, and then switches back to law professor mode to
argue for a new interpretation of the law are also common. Both these enterprises distinguish ELS
scholars from an earlier generation of law and economics scholars who drew on economic theory
to argue for or explain particular interpretations of cases and statutes or to advocate particular laws
or policies. These scholars too often failed to complement their theoretical grounding with
empirically rigorous attempts to look at what was actually happening.
13. See, e.g., Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
567 (1978) (sketching a general theory of the
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses).
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these virtues.14
We should thus be wary of drawing hard and fast lines between traditional legal
scholarship and the kind of systematic parsing, assembly, and analysis of
textual data that some sociolegal scholars do.15
From my perspective then, almost all efforts to construct theories of law
and the many things it touches are empirical; so much so that it is natural to
ask, ―How else can one build theory but through empirical research?‖ Yet
classic theory building is not rigorously empirical. Its model is physics.
I
Although empirical information may have inspired physics theorizing—
think Newton’s falling apple—the link from empirical evidence to theory
building is often loose.16 Following Thomas Kuhn,17 the history of many
sciences has been understood as one of paradigm shifts. Explanations for
observed phenomena are advanced within the parameters of a particular
theoretical paradigm, but as our window on the world opens wider, facts that
are hard to fit within the dominant paradigm emerge. At some point, the
accumulation of anomalous facts makes the inadequacy of the dominant
paradigm obvious, and a new paradigm arises to explain everything the prior
paradigm could explain, as well as the facts it could not make sense of. The
new paradigm then dominates understanding and theory construction until so
many new anomalies have arisen that a new overarching theory is needed to
reconcile them.
Scientific theories always seek to make sense of the world ―out there,‖ but
data may or may not be collected with theory in mind. In physics, unlike much
social science, formal theory usually guides the search for data. Albert Einstein,
for example, developed his general theory of relativity in an effort to extend the
concept to include gravity in a way that was mathematically consistent with the
special theory he had developed some years before.18 The key empirical data
14. Posting of Richard Lempert to Empirical Legal Studies Blog, http://www.elsblog.org/
the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/08/day_2___whats_i.html (Aug. 8, 2006, 00:17 EST).
15. See, e.g.,
,
(1988).
16. I am thinking here primarily of those branches of modern physics that seek to
understand the nature of matter, basic forces like gravity and the origin of the cosmos. If,
however, theory in physics is often driven by the mathematical implications of relationships,
physicists have never lost sight of the importance of testing their theories empirically and revising
them in the light of new empirical information. However much confidence they may have in
theoretical derivations, physicists as a community properly regard theoretical advances as
provisional until confirmed by empirical data. Hence, numbers of Nobel Prizes in physics have
gone to experimentalists, and high energy physicists and astrophysicists have successfully lobbied
for billions of dollars of investments in telescopes and ever more powerful colliders.
17.
,
(3d ed. 1996).
18
,
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indicating Einstein had ―got it right‖ was Arthur Stanley Eddington’s evidence
that light was affected by the sun’s gravity. Eddington reported that light bent
exactly as Einstein had predicted, when measured during a solar eclipse.19
Eddington, however, was not examining the behavior of light to build a theory,
but rather to test one. His search would not have occurred had Einstein’s theory
not existed.20 Indeed, in modern theoretical physics even the anomalies to be
reconciled are often not empirical; rather, they are mathematical inconsistencies
or gaps in received theory. Thus, billions of dollars are being spent not to
generate theory, but, as in the search for the Higgs boson, to confirm or call
into question a theoretical view that is regarded as likely but unproven.
Social scientists are not physicists, and people are much harder to
understand and model than even questionably existent subatomic particles. Not
only is human behavior context dependent, but people have minds of their own
and can behave in unexpected ways. Hence, we should not expect that efforts to
understand people and their groups, institutions and social creations (like the
law), will be amenable to mapping in such strict mathematical terms that the
math itself will reveal gaps in understanding and suggest probable gap-filling
explanations.21
Further complications arise because not only are most social science
theories true only in a statistical sense,22 but also, even if central tendencies
matter, it is often behavior occurring in the tails of distributions that is of most
concern. People and groups at the extremes of human distributions (violent
terrorists, for example) are usually not there just because of bad luck or other
random factors. Many will differ from more typical actors in systematic, caused
ways. Efforts to understand the sources of these differences are confounded
both because extreme behavior is rare and because actors may exhibit the same
extreme behavior for different reasons. One suicide bomber may, for example,
be motivated by ideological commitments and another by a desire to avenge a
sibling’s death.23
85–140 (2000).
19. It has been suggested that Eddington’s report of precise coincidence with Einstein’s
prediction was not an accurate characterization of his data even though Einstein’s prediction was
correct. If so, Eddington’s report indicates a danger of beginning research with deeply held theory;
one may see data as more closely aligned with theoretical predictions than is in fact the case. See
,
57–64 (2004).
20. See generally
,
(2007).
21. This, however, does not mean that social science methods and models cannot provide
reliable predictions. They can, particularly if the effort is to predict aggregate behaviors like
voting in an election or responses to economic incentives.
22. Many physical science theories also allow for only stochastic prediction, but unlike the
concerns of social science, stochastic uncertainty does not have obviously important effects at the
level at which humans live.
23. In recent years, both social science research and the theories built on it are changing, as
increased computing power allows better modeling of complexity and emergent relationships.
Most empirical research to date on law and in the social sciences has been either qualitative or
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A. Grand Theory
Despite these differences between the social sciences and the physical and
natural sciences, the physics model of the primacy of theory and the celebrity
status accorded its theoreticians has had substantial spillover effects within the
social sciences that only in recent years have subsided.
When I began studying sociology in the 1960s, the most celebrated
sociologist in the country was Talcott Parsons, with Robert Merton not far
behind. Neither, however, offered a theory that would have been recognized as
such by a physicist, or by a chemist, geologist, or biologist for that matter.
What Parsons and Merton offered was not so much theory as perspectives for
making sense of much that was going on in social life. Their ―theories‖ were
not silly, but they lacked precision. In particular, it was hard to draw from these
and similar social science ―theories‖ hypotheses that made it possible to
conduct rigorous empirical testing.24 Even operationalizing core theoretical
concepts was difficult and open to dispute. Moreover, to the extent these
theories had empirical support, their predictions characterized only a portion of
cases examined, and, unlike physics, these theories were never adequately
captured in the language of mathematics. The same was true of other
theoretical perspectives in vogue when I was a student, including Weberian
theory,25 Durkheimian theory,26 and Marxist theory27—theories still invoked,
sometimes with continued awe, almost fifty years later. It is also true of grander
theories advanced since then, including World Systems Theory,28 or to give a

based on variations of regression models. Today, new kinds of models, like agent-based models
and network models, are gaining prominence. Theory is often incorporated at the micro level and
expectations about social behavior and clustering are allowed to emerge, including behavior at the
tails of distributions. If emergent patterns are much like what has been known to have happened,
the validity of theorized starting points is likely presumed, and model results that project beyond
the known to the unknown may be offered as empirical projections. I do not know where these
efforts will lead. They may well transform social science research on legal phenomena. I am,
however, confident they will not displace the need for good theory and sound empirical research.
24. In fairness, data availability and quality and the statistical methods of the day
constituted substantial barriers to rigorous quantitative empirical testing.
25.
,
(1986);
,
(Edward Shils trans., Max Rheinstein ed. & trans., Harvard University
Press 1954) (1925);
,
,
(Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1958) (1905).
26.
,
(W.D. Halls trans., The Free
Press 1984) (1893);
,
(W.D. Halls trans., The
Free Press 1982) (1895);
,
, (John A.
Spaulding trans., George Simpson ed. & trans., The Free Press 1951) (1897);
,
(1976).
27.
,
(Chris Turner trans., Verso 1995);
(Tom Bottomore, ed., Blackwell 2d ed., 1991);
,
(Frederick Engels ed., 1867);
,
(Barbara Einhorn trans., 1978).
28.
,
(1982).
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sociolegal example, Donald Black’s ―pure sociological‖ theory of the behavior
of law.29
Works by these authors and by others writing in the grand theoretical
tradition are often admirable for their scholarship—it is, for example, difficult
even today to read Weber and not be struck by his erudition, his attempt to
deeply root his ideas in empirical fact, and the continued relevance of many of
his observations about legal, social and organizational life. Nevertheless,
Weber did not construct theories that can be, on the one hand, definitively
rejected or, on the other hand, made much more probable by the analysis of
empirical data. Perhaps because it is difficult to characterize Weberian theory
in formal terms, his ideas have neither been fully cast aside nor fully
incorporated into later theoretical work.
B. Middle-Range Theory
It is not just grand theories that have these qualities. Middle-range
theories, such as actor-network-theory,30 resource mobilization theory,31
labeling theory,32 differential association theory,33 normalization theory,34 and
new social movement theory,35 are all similar in their resistance to rigorous
formalization, uncertainties in testing their predictions, the inconsistency with
which they seem to hold true, and the difficulty of encompassing them within
larger, more general theories. These middle-range theories can nonetheless be
insightful. Although they seldom allow precise predictions, they help make
sense, in a narrative way, of particular behaviors or realms of social action, and
they have provided the theoretical underpinnings for many empirical studies.
Yet, as theory they are ultimately unsatisfying. When different theories are
offered to explain the same terrain, empirical evidence seldom forces the

29.
30.

,
(2005);

(1976).
,

(1999).
31.
(Mayer N. Zald and John D. NcCarthy eds., 1979); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N.
Zald, Resource Mobilization Theory: Vigorous or Outmoded?, in
533 (Jonathan H. Turner ed., 2001).
32.
,
(1963);
,
(1967);
,
(1971).
33.
,
(1964);
Ross L. Matsueda, The Current State of Differential Association Theory, 34
.
277 (1988).
34. Carl May & Tracy Finch, Implementing, Embedding, and Integrating Practices: An
Outline of Normalization Process Theory, 43
. 535 (2009); Carl R. May et al., Development of
a Theory of Implementation and Integration: Normalization Process Theory, 4
29 (2009).
35.
(Enrique Laraña et al. eds.,
1994); Steven M. Buechler, New Social Movement Theories, 36
441, (1995).
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rejection of one in favor of another. Nor do these middle-range theories seem
capable of being assimilated into some larger, more complete theoretical
framework to give us a more adequate theory of a broader range of social
phenomena.36
C. Micro-Level Theory
The most specific and in some ways the most successful social science
theories are closely tied to narrow studies and aggregates of narrow studies.
―Micro-level‖ theory-building studies come in two flavors. Some focus
narrowly on hypotheses implied by larger theories. Others aim at advancing
new theory to explain specific, well-defined behavior.37 Theory at this level
forms the spine of articles rather than of books.
D. Testing Theories
Although the first flavor of micro-level research may resemble
Eddington’s in that a specific hypothesis is drawn from a larger theory,
operationalized, and tested, even when this is true such tests seldom go to the
heart of what the larger theory is about. Hence it is almost always wrong to say
that the larger theory has been supported by or failed a crucial test. Typically
only a narrow theoretical proposition drawn from the broader theory is
substantially supported, and effective tests of the larger implications of
sociolegal theories are rare, despite the claims that authors sometimes make.
Not only is it difficult to unambiguously identify small-scale implications of
larger theories, but even when this can be done it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to collect data that reliably represent core theoretical concepts.
Further problems arise because theories are often stated in more or less
absolute terms while empirical results, even if they are generally consistent
with theoretical expectations, inevitably contain cases and/or variables that do
not behave as theory would predict. These difficulties can be seen in efforts by
sociolegal scholars to put some of the field’s grand theories to the test, such as
sociological attempts to use Human Relations Area File data to test Durkheim’s
ideas about the relationship between the quality of legal institutions and social
organization,38 and a number of efforts to test the theory Black advanced in the
36. Empirical evidence is not, however, irrelevant to their persistence, for middle-range
theories come into and go out of fashion, and an accumulation of consistent or conflicting
evidence, when it exists, can be an important influence on this flux. Nonempirical factors such as
ideological preferences, narrative fit to prominent exemplars, and the intellectual attractions of
novel ideas can also influence the attention given different explanations.
37. No theory can be reliably established by a single study, and few if any areas of social
science investigation explore unstudied phenomena. Thus, authors who do specific studies and
contribute to theory on what I call the micro level typically situate their work within an existing
literature and their contributions gain credibility from consistency with what others have found.
38. Steven F. Messner, Societal Development, Social Equality, and Homicide: A CrossNational Test of a Durkheimian Model, 61
225 (1982); Richard D. Schwartz &
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Behavior of Law by empirically examining predictions derived from it.39 The
tests of Durkheim’s theory were thwarted by insufficient variance in the
developmental stages of Area Files societies and too much variance in these
societies’ other characteristics. Research on Black’s theory, whether conflicting
or supportive, was unconvincing because the settings used as test beds for the
theory were too situation specific to fairly test Black’s sweeping propositions.40
Articles that claim to test hypotheses derived from middle-range or microlevel theories, especially those that advance their own theory and then
purportedly test and find support for it, often have other problems. Such articles
typically begin by summarizing or advancing a theory and by rehearsing the
evidence for or against it. The instant study is then situated as a test of that
theory or an extension of it. Next the author sets out hypotheses implied by the
theory followed by a description of the data and methods that enable hypothesis
testing. Finally, the author reports the results of the empirical analysis, more
often than not confirming many, if not all, of the specified hypotheses.
Frequently however, especially in the case of novel theories, it is hard to avoid
the suspicion that the research path was more inductive than the author claims,
for it is easy to believe that the empirical results did more to shape the
theoretical discussion than the theory did to guide the empirical investigation.
This feeling is particularly strong when an article advances a novel theory or
James C. Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70
159 (1964); Stephen D.
Webb, Crime and the Division of Labor: Testing a Durkheimian Model, 78
643
(1972).
39. Michael R. Gottfredson & Michael J. Hindelang, A Study of the Behavior of Law, 44
. 3 (1979); Candace Kruttschnitt, Social Status and Sentences of Female Offenders,
15
247 (1980–1981).
40. I should perhaps say the research was unconvincing to me. Black wrote his book to
invite such testing, and if the theory is taken as he presents it, the tests are valid because Black
argues that his theory applies at all levels—from dyads to whole societies—where there are legal
relationships. Taking this claim literally, Black’s theory should be rejected because a number of
studies yield results wholly or partially inconsistent with Black’s theoretical predictions. But to
investigate the implications of Black’s law-like propositions such as ―downward law is greater
than upward law‖ in specific settings (for example, bail setting in one jurisdiction) provides a poor
test of Black’s general theory. Such tests are weak because of difficulties in operationalizing the
most theoretically relevant variables, the limited range of variation in test settings, and the
frequent presence of unmeasured confounding variables. Yet even if Black’s theory did not
explain the behavior of law in a particular setting, it might nonetheless be generally true in a
statistical sense across many settings, and, in particular, it might explain how law was invoked and
applied at the macro level.
My core difficulty with Black’s theory, as presented originally and as subsequently
elaborated, is that it is far too immodestly presented. By purporting to explain how law is applied
at all levels and in all circumstances, the theory overreaches and explains nothing. But treating the
theory as a set of propositions that are predicted to hold true statistically at more macro levels,
Black makes a contribution. He advances a number of propositions that are generally true of law,
and their claimed general truth is not effectively threatened by the failure of some studies to
substantiate particular derived predictions. Seen in this light, however, the theory suffers from
other problems. It cannot explain why it is true only generally and why there are deviations from
its predictions that seem to result from something other than random variation. Not only does it
fail to illuminate the mechanisms behind its predicted relationships, it does not seek to do so.
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theoretical wrinkle.
II
THE INEVITABILITY OF THEORY
Those who conclude from this introduction that I am no great fan of much
of what passes for theory in the social sciences are correct. Too often, ―theory‖
is an academic’s word for ―explanation,‖ and too rarely do social scientists
other than economists attempt to formalize theory in mathematical terms or to
create more encompassing empirically testable formulations. Moreover, except
to some extent in economics, efforts to build more formal theory have seldom
been a solution. Social life is so complex, so unsystematically studied, and so
fraught with data acquisition and measurement problems that there are huge
gaps in the knowledge needed for realistic formalization. Where formal theory
has been attempted, as in some work in law and economics, the incorporation
of unproven or implausible assumptions has led to often-justified suspicion of
the purported real-world implications of the theory advanced.
Nonetheless, I am not prepared to write off theory or the theoretical
enterprise. Indeed, I fault some empirical work for its ignorance of theory or its
acknowledgement of theory with the scholarly equivalent of a nod and a wink.
Not only does theory permeate everything an empirical researcher does,
whether acknowledged or not, but it is also the basis from which social
scientists make policy recommendations and is essential in assessing the likely
reliability of empirical results.
All empirical scholarship is theoretically informed, at least in the weak
sense that problem selection, model construction, and even the information
captured in qualitative research reflect expectations about what matters. These
expectations are the products of theories.
Consider research on the legal profession. If theory tells us that gender
should influence the job choices of young lawyers, we would not attempt to
model those choices without controlling for or measuring the effects of gender.
Similarly, if theory suggests that income should increase with experience but at
a declining rate, we would include a curvilinear component in our measure of
earnings. In short, whatever complaints one might make about the imprecision,
inconsistency, over- and under-inclusion, pretentiousness, incompleteness, or
limited applicability of social science theories, the answer is not to ignore or
dismiss the importance of theory. Rather, it is to combine attention to theory
with empirical investigation in ways that will add to our knowledge and
understanding.
A. Important Distinctions
1. Small “t” or Large “T”
In thinking about how theory informs, and can be tested by, empirical
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investigation, some distinctions are fundamental. The most important is
between theory (with a small ―t‖) and Theory (with a capital ―T‖).41
Researchers always approach empirical investigations with small ―t‖ theories,
that is to say, expectations about how the world works and what is needed to
understand phenomena of interest. Quantitative researchers begin their
inquiries with a sense of what variables might explain the outcomes they are
investigating, and they seek to include them as explanatory or control variables
in their models. Qualitative researchers similarly begin their inquiries with a
sense of which behaviors are important to observe and what makes for
trustworthy informants. These sensibilities reflect both implicit and explicit
theories about how the world works. They have many sources, including: (1)
common sense (gender affects so many relationships that I should check to see
if it affects this one); (2) prior findings (Jones and Smith found that CEO
gender affected company share price, so my model of share price movements
should control for it); (3) generalized knowledge (since women make different
career choices than men, I should control for gender when exploring how law
school prestige relates to job choices); and (4) knowledge of large ―T‖ Theory
(theories of role strain suggest that women with children will respond
differently to time demands than single women or married women without
children; therefore, I must control not just for gender but also for the presence
of children in explaining lawyer job choices).
The inevitability of theory in these ways need not, however, lead to what I
would call ―theoretically informed‖ investigation; that is, research designed to
yield results that can be expected to either strengthen a social science theory or
call it into question. An investigation should be called theoretically informed
only when theory guides research in one of two ways. The first requires social
science (or large ―T‖) Theories to have implications clear enough to allow the
derivation of specific hypotheses that can be operationalized to guide
investigation. The second occurs when a researcher posits a new theory or an
extension of an existing theory before data collection and/or analysis begins
and derives from the new theory hypotheses that test it. In limiting the concept
―theoretically informed‖ to these circumstances, I do not mean to say that
theory cannot be derived or supported inductively in light of what data reveal.
But other things being equal, theoretically consistent results support a theory
more persuasively if they have been specified in advance.
2. A Priori or Post Hoc
The distinction between theory as a priori expectation and theory as post
hoc explanation matters. When a theory and hypotheses drawn from it are
specified prior to research and analysis, explanations in terms of the theory are
41. For examples of capital ―T‖ theory see the examples of grand and middle-range
theories cited in supra notes 25–35.
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more credible than when the results of a completed analysis are given a
theoretical interpretation. This is true not just of overarching explanatory theory
but also of the theories that guide research design.
There are two principal reasons why this is so. First, people are good at
finding patterns, even among randomly associated variables,42 and they are also
good at plausibly explaining the patterns they find. Post hoc, it is almost always
possible to generate or find some theoretical explanation for empirical results.
Second, with enough bites at the data-analytic apple, it is usually possible to
find some order in social science data, even if that order exists only by chance.
Introducing and omitting control variables, changing variable measurement,
and exploring different functional forms may yield results that suggest
nonchance relationships when other measurement and model choices would
show no associations.43
The dangers of post hoc model specification and theorizing are
particularly great—and, I suspect, too often realized—in litigation and policyoriented research where the aim is to support a party’s position or a funder’s
policy preferences. These dangers exist, however, whenever a researcher has an
interest in advancing or supporting a theory or conclusion. Quantitative
researchers often recognize (and criticize) as a problem with qualitative
research the possibility that the researcher found not the truth, but what she
went looking for. But the danger of a consciously or unconsciously ―rigged‖
analysis is not only shared by quantitative research, it is often more insidious
because the influence of potential bias is less transparent.
3. A Personal Example
To avoid suspicion of their results, litigation- and policy-oriented
researchers should take special care to ensure that their choice of data and
methods do not favor the outcome they desire.44 This concern affected, for
42. For example, I found this number sequence in a book I was leafing through: 03, 07, 11
. . . . What number comes next? Most people would say 15. But the next number in the text was
20. The sequence came from a portion of a table of random numbers as reproduced in
,
437 (1st ed. 1960). Cf.
,
(2005) (discusses
the way investors and others are fooled by the human tendency to causally interpret random
variation).
43. The situation is analogous to the widely recognized problem of significance testing in
many variable models. If enough tests are done of enough variables, one can expect some
significant relationships to emerge even if all associations are in fact random. There are ways to
correct statistically for this possibility, but in epidemiology and in some of the social sciences they
are seldom employed. Similarly, if data are measured and examined in enough different ways, it is
likely that some approach to the data will yield apparent nonchance relationships even if no such
relationships exist. The number of different ways a researcher has examined her data is less visible
than the number of variables in a model, and even if known, I know of no way to statistically
correct for it.
44. This is not too much to ask of policy-oriented academic researchers, but so long as we
have our current adversary system, one cannot expect most litigation researchers to avoid
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example, how David Chambers, Terry Adams and I analyzed the data from our
study of how Michigan Law School’s minority students fared post graduation.45
We were not concerned with testing theory.46 Instead we wanted to know
whether Michigan’s minority students had successful post-law-school careers
and how their career success compared to that of Michigan’s white alumni. We
knew that our work might figure in the politically divisive debate on
affirmative action, and because all of us supported affirmative action, we
sought to foreclose charges that we had rigged our analysis to favor outcomes
that accorded with our values. We also sought to guard against even the
unconscious temptation to find results that favored our preferences. Hence, we
did something I do not, as a rule, recommend: we avoided almost all
preliminary data analysis.47 We specified our variables and how we would
measure them before we looked at the data, and we reported in footnotes all
relevant results of sensitivity testing. Still it is natural that some people will
suspect our results, particularly our failure to reject the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in the career success of Michigan’s minority and white
graduates—a result that many people (myself included) find surprising.
Unfortunately, we have no way of refuting those who will not believe our
assertions of how we proceeded.48
On this last point, theory could help. To the extent that our results are
consistent with well-supported theory, they become more credible.49 Our work,

choosing data and methods likely to support preferred results. These experts are hired with the
goal of proving certain facts, and their findings will not be presented unless they support the case
of the party that hired them. Even worse, litigators who do not welcome the results of one
commissioned study have been known to commission others and to keep the existence of the prior
results from those who do the later research.
45. Richard Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s Minority
Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25
395
(2000).
46. Id. In retrospect, this was to the study’s detriment. Had we begun the research with a
theoretical as well as an empirical agenda, we would have collected far more data on social class,
among other things.
47. We did examine regression models with variables we did not include in our final
models, eliminating variables if they were both insignificant and of no apparent theoretical
importance. We also added a variable to our model based on a comment received.
48. One way to alleviate suspicion, which we have done, is to make data available to others
with different preferences. A problem exists, however, because the same factors that allow an
unethical researcher to make data and model choices that appear to lend strong support to a
favored hypothesis allow a would-be critic to find apparent relationships in data that call a prior
analysis into question.
49. Other empirical research helps as well. Thus, our results gain credibility from their
consistency with scholarship in the area, including smaller scale studies of minority physicians.
See
,
(1998); Robert Davidson &
Ernest Lewis, Affirmative Action and Other Special Consideration Admissions at the University of
California, Davis, School of Medicine, 278
1153 (1997); Stephen Keith et al.,
Effects of Affirmative Action in Medical School: A Study of the Class of 1975, 313
1519 (1985); Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in
Providing Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334
1305 (1996); Ernest
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however, was not driven by theory in the larger sense, even if our choice of
variables and models was motivated by small ―t‖ theoretical understandings of
how outcomes relate to success and what variables might influence outcomes.
Our contributions to larger theoretical perspectives came in two forms: (1)
puzzling results, which, if confirmed in other work, merit more theoretically
focused study,50 and (2) findings that support (but do not prove) theories that
elevate law school prestige above most other variables in explaining the career
success of law school graduates.
4. Limits of an Example
It should be clear from this brief reference to my own work that I am
neither arguing that empirical research must be theory driven in the capital ―T‖
sense nor am I suggesting that the hypotheses a researcher poses for testing
need have such theoretical roots. I am also not suggesting that quantitative
researchers should avoid exploratory data analysis (EDA). My views are to the
contrary.51 EDA is a good way of presenting information about data
distribution and comparing data distributions over time or in the context of
other variables.52 EDA also helps to determine what functional form best suits a
data set, when collapsing variables into indices makes sense, whether
assumptions of particular methods are met, and the most revealing way to
distinguish variable states, among other things.53 Thus, I am not opposed to
Moy & Barbara A. Bartman, Physician Race and Care of Minority and Medically Indigent
Patients, 273
1515 (1995).
50. For example, we found to our surprise that although an admissions index combining
LSAT scores and undergraduate grade-point averages predicted law school grades, and although
law school grades predicted later income, there was no relationship between the admission index
and later income even in models where the index might have served as a proxy for law school
grades. Lempert et al., supra note 45, at 401–02.
51. I have long admired the path-breaking work of John Tukey and his arguments for EDA.
See
,
(1977).
, as introduced by Tukey,
involves different relatively simple ways of examining data to check for, capture, and portray
patterns with minimal loss of information, usually as a prelude to more complex analysis. Other
forms of EDA test whether the assumptions of different approaches to data analysis are in fact
met. One must, however, be cautious in choosing models based on what preliminary analysis
reveals about apparent relationships, for when variables are dropped because they are insignificant
in a preliminary analysis, standard errors on the remaining variables may be distorted. One
solution, if the size of the data set allows, is to make model selection decisions based on the
analysis of a random subsample of cases and then test the model on the remaining data. Only the
results of the test should be considered reliable. For an in-depth discussion of this issue and an
illustration of model selection dangers see Richard Berk, Lawrence Brown & Linda Zhao,
Statistical Inference After Model Selection, 26
217 (2009).
52. Box and whisker plots, first advanced by Tukey as a form of EDA, are now a standard
way of presenting information about data midpoints and spreads in an easy to understand fashion.
Id. at 39–43.
53. The Michigan study, I expect, would have been better had we engaged in more EDA,
including exploring different alternatives for examining our data. Lempert, supra note 45. But as
already noted, the political sensitivity of our subject matter coupled with our views on affirmative
action counseled against looking closely at the data before deciding what relationships to examine
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extensive EDA, unmoored from hypothesis testing. Indeed, the clear
presentation of variable distributions and simple patterns of associations among
variables are often the most revealing products of empirical investigation.54
Similarly, I am not denying a place in social science research for empirical
analysis uninformed by larger theory. In many areas of sociolegal scholarship,
larger theories from which testable hypotheses can be derived do not exist,
either because a matter is under-theorized or because of insurmountable model
and/or data problems. These gaps should be reasons to do more rather than less
research on a question. Indeed, curiosity with no expectation of what will turn
up is itself a sufficient driver of research. Accumulating information about how
the world works, whatever the starting point or motivation, is often what calls
existing theory into question and stimulates new theoretical insights. This is
true in every empirical discipline.
E. Dustbowl Empiricism
There is, however, one mode of empirically driven data analysis that can
seriously mislead and seldom has much to offer. This is to work in ways that
are not only uninformed by capital ―T‖ theory, but that also minimize the
contributions that small ―t‖ theories make to research design. Rather than
formulate specific hypotheses or pare down potential variables to a
parsimonious model based on theoretical expectations, some empirical studies
include every available variable that can conceivably explain a dependent
variable and then let a computer choose what seems important.55 The problem
with this kind of ―dustbowl‖ or ―brute‖ empiricism is that it risks identifying as
significant relationships that only exist by chance56 or which, if statistically
significant, are nonetheless too weak to be of either theoretical or practical
importance. Moreover, by including variables that proxy for each other, true
relationships may be hidden. Hence it is not surprising that the results of brute
empiricism are often puzzling. Some statistically significant variables may
perform as established theory, common sense, or general knowledge would
suggest, but other including some that are statistically significant may have
unexpected magnitudes or signs. Even worse, the models that reach print may
have been substantially pruned to exclude most of the variables that proved

and what methods to use. Moreover, although our study began without litigation on the horizon, a
suit had been brought against the law school’s affirmative action program by the time we had
reached the data analysis stage. If I were called upon to testify about the study’s results, I wanted
to be able to tell a cross-examiner that we had not looked for likely relationships before
commencing our analysis.
54. See supra note 10; see also
,
2d. ed. 2001) (providing numerous examples of how collecting and
creatively organizing data can reveal otherwise difficult to appreciate relationships).
55. This approach commonly relies on stepwise regression models available in most widely
used statistical packages.
56. See supra note 43.
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insignificant, and this pruning is not always transparent. When such work
appears theory-guided, empirical results may be accorded more weight than
they deserve.
1. Ensuring Process Transparency
My mom-and-apple-pie message here is that regardless of how data have
been analyzed and the role theory has played in the analysis, truth and
transparency should characterize data presentation. When different ways of
coding or analyzing data have yielded different outcomes, the researcher should
disclose this, even if she is confident that the analysis she did for publication is
the scientifically best way of proceeding.57 Similarly, research that did not
begin as an effort to test theoretically derived hypotheses should not present
itself as if this were its pedigree. When a researcher perceives an obvious or
best theoretical explanation for results after an analysis has been done, the post
hoc nature of the explanation should be clear, and the support given the theory
not exaggerated.
Humility is also appropriate, for it is easy to overstate the importance of
what one has found. Theory is not built from a single study. If a theory is well
established, results that only in retrospect appear explicable by the theory are
unlikely to do much to make the theory more plausible than it was before the
investigation. If new theory is offered to explain results, considerable additional
evidence will ordinarily be required for the theory to move from candidate
status to likely explanation.58

57. Readers are justified in presuming that if approaches tried and discarded did not have
some justification in the first instance, they would not have been attempted. Moreover,
information about what did not work and why it did not work may itself be of scientific interest.
58. This will depend to some extent on the nature of the findings and the theory offered to
explain them. Mark Granovetter famously explained why successful job searches tended to owe
more to leads provided by people with narrow and discrete links to the job seeker than to leads
provided by those with more extensive and more intimate ties. Granovetter’s article was almost
immediately regarded as reliable theory for two reasons. First, Granovetter had an intuitively
plausible explanation for his results: weakly tied people collectively linked the job seeker to a
wide array of diverse opportunities while intimates tended to know the same people and
possibilities as the job seeker and so provided less added value to the search. Second,
Granovetter’s theory could not only be represented formally but the intuitive explanation is
consistent with what one would expect from network models. For a summary of early empirical
tests of the model. For a summary of the original article and a discussion of later research, see
Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1
201
(1983).
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III
USES OF THEORY59
Theory is not just theoretical; it is useful. It is essential to the scientific
understanding of social phenomena, to focusing empirical investigation, to
evaluating research, and to making responsible policy prescription.
A. Focusing Empirical Investigation
Theories embody the social science understanding of the phenomena we
investigate. Anyone, however, can advance a theory, and implausible theories
abound. To provide validated social science understandings, theories must be
tested against data and withstand those tests. A virtue of good theories is that
they make it easy to derive appropriate tests.60
1. An Example from Durkheim
Arthur Stinchcombe, in his marvelous primer Constructing Social
Theories,61 draws on Emile Durkheim’s Suicide62 for an iconic example of the
logic of scientific inference. The example illustrates how implications derived
from well-specified theory allow convincing real-world tests.
Stinchcombe begins by restating the core of Durkheim’s theory of egoistic
suicide: ―A higher degree of individualism in a social group causes a higher
rate of suicide in that group.‖63 Durkheim drew from this simple theory and his
knowledge of French and European society specific expectations about what
data would reveal. Protestants, Durkheim argued, were less involved in their
churches than Catholics and consequently should have higher suicide rates.
Married men with children were linked more tightly to others than bachelors,
so marrying and raising a family should diminish the rate of male suicides.
Jews in Durkheim’s time were forced to cohere, so their suicide rates should be
low as well.
Data supported these and other theory-consistent expectations. This left
Durkheim justifiably confident that he was onto something. Particularly
important to Durkheim’s project was the data on suicide among Jews.
Durkheim, Stinchcombe tells us, had found that urban location, commercial
employment, and education, were all positively associated with suicide. These
results were consistent with his theory since these variables were more than
likely associated with greater individualism. But commercial employment and
59. In this section I shall be referring only to causal theories. This is, of course, the sense of
theory that has predominated in this Article, but I have also referred to theory of at least two other
types: theories of meaning (as in the theory of the case), and theories of being (as in the theories of
the atom).
60. Whether the tests are easy to accomplish is another matter.
61.
,
15–28 (1987).
62.
,
, supra note 26.
63.
, supra note 61, at 15.
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greater education were themselves associated with urban residence, and it was
possible that something about urban life other than the lack of social
attachments that Durkheim posited increased suicidal propensities. If this was
the case, then French Jews who were disproportionately urban, well educated,
and engaged in commerce should have suicide rates much like their similarly
situated neighbors. But if individualism was the causal mechanism, these
markers of urban life would not affect Jews in the way they affected other
Frenchmen since they did not undercut solidarity within the Jewish community.
When the data revealed that Jews committed suicide at far lower rates than
other commercially engaged urban dwellers, Durkheim’s theory received
substantial support.64
2. An Example from Ellickson
Another example, more familiar to sociolegal scholars, is Robert
Ellickson’s investigation into the real-world validity of the Coase Theorem.65
Ellickson chose to investigate how liability for damages done to or by
wandering cattle was apportioned in a California county. The genius of this
study was that it looked empirically at a situation that Ronald Coase had used
hypothetically in a seminal article to illustrate what later became known as the
Coase Theorem.66 Ellickson found that the Coase Theorem did not hold as an
empirical matter. Contrary to the Coasean expectation, the initial placement of
liability for damage done by roving cattle affected the final asset distribution.
This finding did not directly contradict anything Coase’s Theorem had
postulated because Coase had made it clear from the start that his theorem
presumed a nonexistent world of zero transaction costs. Ellickson’s empiricism
does, however, undermine policy recommendations justified in part by
reference to Coase because it revealed that Coase, unlike Durkheim, had not
produced a valid social theory. Although as a matter of economic logic the
theory may be impeccable, it does not, if Ellickson’s results can be trusted,
advance our understanding of human behavior.67 Indeed, even in a zero64. Durkheim’s theory of suicide is a bit more complicated than this. Durkheim recognized
that not all suicides could be explained by the forces that led to egoistic suicide. Thus his book
defines three other types of suicide: (1) altruistic suicide in which the causes of egoistic suicide
are turned on their head, (2) anomic suicide, and (3) fatalistic suicide.
65.
,
(1991).
66. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
1, 2–8 (1960). Coase’s
claim (which George Stigler rather than Coase first denominated a theorem) is that when trade is
possible and there are no transaction costs, the initial allocation of property rights and liability for
their infringement does not matter because bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless
of the initial allocation.
67. In fairness to Coase, there is no reason to believe he ever intended his theory to do this.
The theory’s implication for understanding social transactions is not that the placement of liability
burdens does not matter, but that to understand how a situation will resolve itself one must focus
on transaction costs. Theorists in law and economics nonetheless used the Coase Theorem to
derive policy recommendations without having determined the likely burdens of transaction costs.
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transaction-cost world, it is not clear that people would behave as Coase
predicts.68
Drawing empirical implications from theories is often the easy part.
Determining empirically if the implications hold is the more difficult task.
Theoretical concepts and predictions must be linked to real-world situations
and behavior. This requires finding ways to measure the real-world
manifestations of those concepts and predictions69 and devising ways to assess
whether theoretical expectations hold.
Durkheim, despite the primitive state of social science methods in his day,
took on a manageable challenge. The theoretical concept of suicide maps
directly onto actual suicides, and France had good data on suicide rates.
Individualism, which for Durkheim referenced the degree to which an
individual’s behavior is self directed rather than shaped by group norms, is
more ambiguously related to observable conditions. Nevertheless, there was
substantial consensus in Durkheim’s France that Protestants as a group were
less closely regulated by church norms than Catholics or Jews, and that
bachelors had generally shallower relations with others than family men. But in
other societies connections like these might have been debatable, and had
Durkheim’s altruistic suicide70 been as common in France as egoistic suicide,
aggregate suicide rates would not have enabled a test of the theory. Whether it
is easy or difficult to test a theory is, however, beside the current point, which
is that an important virtue of theory is that it focuses empirical investigation.
Ellickson’s work indicates that this is no easy matter, for the economic costs associated with doing
business did not drive the deviations between the Coasean prediction that liability placement
would be of no consequence and how people actually behaved. Rather, the relevant transaction
costs were social in nature. They were the costs of violating norms and disrupting social
relationships.
68. See generally Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15
427 (1972) (theoretical questioning). Empirically, game theory experiments indicate that rational
actor model predictions do not routinely hold, even in situations where their assumptions appear
fully met. Cf. Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, What’s in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in
Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 68
. 29 (2003) (Finding that when
players in the dictator game knew the names of those they were playing against they were more
generous, but this did not hold for players in the ultimatum game.); Carolyn H. Declerck, Toko
Kiyonari & Christophe Boone, Why Do Responders Reject Unequal Offers in the Ultimatum
Game? An Experimental Study on the Role of Perceiving Interdependence, 30
.
335 (2009) (finding that contrary to expectations, interdependence did not affect proposer
behavior, although it spurred responders to be more rational); Andrew Schotter & Barry Sopher,
Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach, 58
365 (2007) (finding that the advice of earlier participant in an
ultimatum game affects the behavior of replacement participant and that fairness justifications are
used to justify offer rejections by receivers).
69. As Ellickson’s work indicates, the assessment need not involve quantification;
interviewing informants is one way of determining what is happening and why. Ellickson, supra
note 65, at 6–9.
70. Altruistic suicide is the opposite of egoistic suicide in that it is motivated by such close
involvement with a group that one is willing to die for the group or in support of its norms.
Suicide bombing is a current example.
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B. Evaluating Empirical Research
A second virtue of theory is its value in evaluating empirical research,
sometimes in overlooked ways. Theory provides a vantage point for assessing
the adequacy of models and the validity of conclusions derived from modeling
efforts. If a model omits or poorly measures theoretically important variables,
or if some modeled relationships make no theoretical sense, then there is good
reason to view skeptically claims based on the model. This is true even if core
results are consistent with reasonable theoretical claims. There is also reason to
be skeptical of a study’s results if outcomes differ when an analysis is altered in
theoretically irrelevant ways. In short, one should approach empirical studies
with the following expectations: (1) Expect robustness to theory-irrelevant
variation. (2) Expect to find theoretically relevant variables included in models
or legitimate reasons for their absence. (3) Expect results for variables that have
been introduced into a model as controls to make theoretical sense. Research on
capital punishment and right-to-carry laws nicely illustrates these points.
1. A Death Penalty Example
In 1975, the economist Isaac Ehrlich published a time series study of the
deterrent effects of capital punishment. Ehrlich analyzed data from 1933 to
1969 using what were at the time advanced techniques of statistical modeling.71
His results indicated that one execution deterred seven or eight homicides. This
was attention grabbing, to say the least, particularly since earlier studies had,
with rare exceptions, found no evidence that capital punishment deterred
homicides and in some cases suggested brutalization effects.
Ehrlich’s work reshaped the empirical debate on capital punishment in
three ways. First, it changed the focus of the debate from the deterrent effects
of having a death penalty to the deterrent effect of executing convicted
murderers. Second, it both marked and encouraged a shift in the methods used
to search for deterrence. Before Ehrlich, the most influential studies either
compared homicide rates in states that seemed similar except for the presence
of the death penalty or looked within states for changes in homicide rates
following the adoption or abolition of the death penalty.72 After Ehrlich, the
search for deterrence almost always relies on complex regression models that
attempt to control for factors, apart from the death penalty, that might be
expected to influence homicide rates.73 Third, before Ehrlich wrote, the
71. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65
397 (1975).
72. See Richard Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the
Case for Capital Punishment, 79
1177, 1197–1206 (1981) (review of studies by
Thorsten Sellin, Isaac Ehrlich, and others).
73. Earlier, apparently simpler, studies were not blind to the need for controls. Most
eschewed statistical modeling in favor of using the proximity of states or in-state longitudinal
designs to control for factors apart from capital punishment that might influence homicide rates.
The adequacy of these controls is questionable, but so is a researcher’s capacity to specifically
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deterrence argument—because of its inconsistency with most extant research—
had ceased to be an important element of the contemporary case for capital
punishment.74 After Ehrlich, claims that deterrence justified the death penalty
had, for a while at least, more credibility.75
Ehrlich’s results were immediately controversial, and soon other social
scientists reexamined Ehrlich’s data using similar statistical approaches.76 Their
efforts revealed that Ehrlich’s finding of deterrence was acutely sensitive to the
years he chose to analyze. If the last years of the time series—the 1960s—were
removed from the analysis, evidence for a deterrent effect disappeared, and in
some analyses a possible brutalization effect emerged.77 During the 1960s,
executions for murder dropped almost to zero, and rates for many crimes,
including crimes never punishable by death, rapidly increased. It is thus likely
that during the 1960s factors other than low execution rates were driving up
murder rates since it is plausible to suppose that murders are affected by social
measure and correctly model all factors that substantially affect homicide rates. For a more
extended discussion of these issues and a sense that the difference in the quality of controls may
not be as great as it might seem, see Richard Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A
New Look in an Old Light, 29
88 (1983).
74. Indeed, it is plausible to think that the failure of earlier research to find that the death
penalty deterred and the suggestion that it might brutalize helped promote the focus on
retributivism as the primary justification for punishment in general and the death penalty in
particular. See, e.g.,
,
(1979).
75. The most immediate indicator of Ehrlich’s influence came soon after his publication,
when the Supreme Court, in reinstituting the death penalty, refused to consider the implications of
its deterrent effect for their decision, noting that the research on deterrent effects was inconsistent.
Ehrlich’s research was the only research suggesting deterrence that the Court cited. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.31 (1976). Responses to Ehrlich, for reasons discussed below, soon
muted the deterrence case for the death penalty, but beginning around the mid 1990s a spate of
econometric research examining the post moratorium use of the death penalty reinvigorated the
deterrence argument to the point where one noted liberal suggested that deterrence might not just
provide an adequate moral justification for the death penalty but might also make it morally
mandatory. See Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?:
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Trade-Offs, 58
703, (2005) (citing scholarship on
the efficacy of capital punishment). But recent critical research is calling the latest deterrence
findings into question just as Ehrlich’s eventually were. See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers,
Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58
791
(2005); see also Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu
All over Again?, 2
303 (2005); Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring &
Amanda Geller, Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share and the Deterrent Effects
of the Death Penalty, 84
1803 (2006). Professor Sunstein later made it clear that his
discussion of the morality of the death penalty did not mean that he accepted the evidence
indicating that capital punishment deterred homicides. Rather in a column written with Justan
Wolfers, one of the prominent critics of the ―new deterrence‖ literature, Sunstein endorsed the
view that, ―the best reading of the accumulated data is that they do not establish a deterrent effect
of the death penalty.‖ Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, A Death Penalty Puzzle: The Murky
Evidence for and Against Deterrence,
, June 30, 2008, at A11.
76. For a detailed discussion of Ehrlich’s study and the work published in response to it see
Lempert, Desert and Deterrence, supra note 72.
77. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is
the Effect of Execution?, 26
453 (1980).
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forces in the same way as armed robberies, rapes and other violent crimes.
Crime rates in the 1960s, coupled with the failure to replicate Ehrlich’s results
with data from different time periods, destroyed his study’s credibility.
This brief tale may seem to recount a case where one analyst’s findings
were trumped by contrary findings of many other scholars. But to the best of
my recollection, none of the competing analysts hit the nail on the head when it
came to explaining why their work refuted Ehrlich’s deterrence claim. It is at
least possible that the high homicide rates in the 1960s were caused by the
scarcity of executions, while increases in other violent crimes had other causes.
The reason why this possibility cannot save Ehrlich’s argument lies in theory.
Ehrlich’s research was not aimed at estimating how many lives each
execution saved. Rather, as Ehrlich described his effort, it was designed to see
whether deterrence theory could explain homicide rates. An implication of that
theory, which accords well with common sense, is that the more likely a person
is to be arrested for and convicted of murder, and the more likely he is to be
executed if he is arrested and convicted, the less likely he is to kill someone.
Ehrlich’s execution results gained credibility because they were not alone in
their fit with deterrence theory. Consistent with theory and with research on
other crimes, Ehrlich found that apprehension probabilities (likelihood of being
arrested for and convicted of murder) were more important to deterrence than
punishment (execution) probabilities given apprehension. So far, so good.
However, nothing about deterrence theory suggests that executions would have
one effect from 1937 through 1960 and a different effect from 1937 through
1967. Rather, deterrence theory implies that, other things being equal, the
effects of executions on homicides should be the same over the entire period, as
well as over any part of it.78 What destroys Ehrlich’s claim that executions
deter homicides is not the inconsistency between Ehrlich’s results and the
results of other analysts who looked at executions over different time periods.
Rather, the flaw is that if Ehrlich’s theory that executions deter homicide is
valid, then there is no good reason to expect that deterrence will disappear
when a theoretically irrelevant parameter, like time period, is varied. The
existence of such unexpected variance, together with evidence that the 1960s
was a time when all crime rates were rising, deservedly discredits Ehrlich’s
results even if, like the Cheshire Cat’s grin, they have long remained in the air.

78. Statistically it could be more difficult to spot deterrence over subsets of the period
studied because of the decreased number of data points, but this statistical issue does not explain
the failure to find deterrence by those who omitted the last years of the time series from their data
since they had enough data points for analysis. Ehrlich’s control variables were intended to ensure
that other factors affecting homicide rates were held constant throughout the period, and while
they were no doubt inadequate to ensure this, neither Ehrlich nor any of his defenders offered
plausible reasons why if the death penalty deterred during the period 1937–67 it should not also
deter during the period 1937–60.
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A second article of Ehrlich’s illustrates another way in which theoretical
sensitivity can attune one to the problematic nature of statistical conclusions.79
Here the focus is on what theory tells us about model construction. Two years
after his initial foray into the death penalty-deterrence debate, Ehrlich
published a second study where he again found that executions deterred
homicides. Using a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal design, Ehrlich
compared homicide rates across states rather than national data over time.
Although it never received the attention of Ehrlich’s first effort, the second
study is in some ways the stronger study because it does not depend on the
crime rise in the 1960s. The model Ehrlich uses suffers, however, from a
glaring omission: it does not distinguish Southern from other states. Yet for the
time periods Ehrlich studied there were good reasons to believe that Southern
states differed from other states in their homicide rates and in their use of the
death penalty, and that these differences were not captured by standard control
variables.80 Prior cross-sectional studies of homicide and other violent crime
rates invariably included a dummy variable for states of the former
confederacy, and the coefficient on that variable was almost always significant.
Ehrlich offered no explanation for deviating from the prior practice. Results
from studies that ignore plausible, available control variables are deservedly
regarded with suspicion.81
2. A “Right to Carry” Example
Even if an analysis appears to support the theory it was designed to test,
79. Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and
Additional Evidence, 85
741 (1977).
80.
,
(1996); Dov Coehn, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdie & Norbert
Schwartz, Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental
Ethnography,” 5
595–60 (1996) (finding that when university students
were bumped or insulted, students from the South were more likely than those from the North to
become upset and show priming for aggression).
81. Ehrlich’s two studies were also suspect because they yielded conflicting estimates of
the number of lives each execution saved. In the longitudinal study the estimate was seven or eight
lives and in the cross-sectional study the estimate was about eighteen. There is no obvious
theoretical or statistical reason to explain the inconsistency in the number of lives saved if the two
models were simply different ways of measuring the same deterrent effect. Although states differ
in many ways that might be relevant to crime rates, as aggregates they are unlikely to be that
different in factors apart from the death penalty that lead to homicide. If each execution really
deterred as many as eighteen murders (and some studies published around the same time as
Ehrlich’s put the number of murders deterred per execution as high as a hundred and fifty!) one
might expect some sign of deterrence even in uncontrolled comparisons. See, e.g., James A.
Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5
45, 65 (1976). Yet the work of Sellin and others who had looked at homicide
rates in neighboring states controlling for time did not find a whisper of deterrence. See Lempert,
Desert and Deterrence, supra note 72. Surely, if each execution saved eighteen lives something
would have been whispering, and if executions so strongly deterred, one would expect that the
existence of death penalty statutes would by themselves have some deterrent effect even if actual
executions were rare, but not even Ehrlich claimed that they did.
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one should be suspicious if it also reports results that are theoretically
inexplicable or incoherent. John Lott and David Mustard’s widely reported
finding that right-to-carry laws diminish violent crime provides an example.82
Lott and Mustard’s hypothesis, that people would be less likely to attack others
if they had reason to fear that those they assaulted were armed, is reasonable
and worth testing. If all Lott and Mustard had found was that, as they predicted,
right-to-carry laws were associated with lower murder, rape, and aggravated
assault rates, their results would initially have had to be taken seriously. But the
co-authors also found that right-to-carry laws were associated with higher rates
of nonviolent property crimes. This makes no theoretical sense.83 Other
empirical implications of the Lott-Mustard model, like the suggestion in the
data that reducing the number of black women over forty would have
substantial crime reduction effects, seem not only theoretically inexplicable but
weird to the point of being incredible.84 Given these peculiarities, it is not
surprising that others who have examined their research call the Lott-Mustard
findings into question.85 If some of the implications of an empirical analysis
make no sense or, worse yet, are obviously false, absent a very good
explanation for why this happened, the safest conclusion is that there is

82. John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26
1, 24–25 (1997).
83. The authors would disagree with this judgment. They argued that different types of
crimes are substitutes for one another, and that as violent crimes are deterred from fear of meeting
someone with a gun, crimes that involve nonconfrontational thefts will be substituted for them.
But as I have pointed out, a theory can be constructed to fit almost any data pattern. When authors
provide a post hoc explanation for a counter-intuitive result, one should be cautious in accepting
it. Lott and Mustard’s theory was borrowed from economics where it often helps make sense of
purchasing decisions, career choices, and the like. It may even sensibly explain choices criminals
make between some crimes; for example, efforts to shut down the market for marijuana in the
1970s may have stimulated the importation of cocaine. But the idea that stealthily stealing from
another might substitute for crimes like rape or murder ignores what we know about differences
between these crimes, the motives for them, and those who commit them. See generally
,
52–79, 274–
309 (1988).
84. Reading this sentence, my Department of Homeland Security colleague Rik Legault
alerted me to research suggesting a possible explanation for this result, albeit one that runs directly
counter to the Lott and Mustard thesis. Data indicate that black women in this demographic are
particularly likely to own handguns, largely because of their fear of crime. David J. Bordua &
Alan J. Lizotte, Patterns of Legal Firearms Ownership: A Cultural and Situational Analysis of
Illinois Counties, 1
147, 159–60 (1979). If these guns are particularly likely to
be borrowed or stolen, then black female handgun ownership could proxy for the greater ease of
hand gun acquisition by people planning violent encounters or other crimes.
85. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55
1193 (2003); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry
Laws Deter Violent Crime?, 27
209 (1998); Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Paul H.
Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives Lost?: The Effects of Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime, 88
. 468 (1998); Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime:
Evidence from State Panel Data, 18
239 (1998); see also Robert A.
Martin, Jr. & Richard L. Legault, Systematic Measurement Error with State-Level Crime Data:
Evidence from the “More Guns, Less Crime” Debate, 42
187 (2005).
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something wrong with the model, methods, or data. In such cases, even those
study outcomes consistent with plausible theory cannot be trusted.
C. Prescribing Policy
A third use for theory lies in its relationship to policy prescription.
Deriving wise policy from empirical research almost always requires
considerable confidence in some theoretical perspective. It is this confidence
that justifies the expectation that particular policies will have desired results. If
the circumstances in which policies were implemented always resembled
closely the contexts in which empirical results were derived, and if the
empirical exercise were repeated in different settings with similar results, one
might prescribe policy on the supposition that what worked in the research
setting would work everywhere. Understanding why a treatment worked would
not matter.86 This may on occasion be true of engineering or medical
interventions, but it is seldom if ever true of social policies.
The scale on which policies are implemented is usually far greater than
the scales on which research has been done. Implementation contexts vary from
study contexts in numerous ways, including, usually, time frame and location.
In laboratory research, such as experimental law and economics and mock jury
studies, the study situation differs in obvious and arguably important ways from
the real world. Moreover, the nature of legal policy is such that one size usually
must fit all, yet different people may react in different ways to the same policy
prescription.
A well-supported theory provides a coherent explanation for why
variables produce the effects they do and the conditions in which relationships
hold. The explanation will identify those causes that are most important in
determining outcomes and how causes relate to outcomes controlling for
context. Knowing these relationships allows policy makers and implementers to
anticipate problems and to adapt policies wisely to differing situations. These
benefits are important enough that we should seldom generalize directly from
empirical results to policy prescriptions. Without the intermediate step of
theory development, empirical investigators, legal or otherwise, are seldom if
ever justified in promoting policy changes or other interventions based on what
their data reveal. Theory resting on a bedrock of rigorous empiricism is the key
to sound, evidence-based social policy. One study, however well-designed,
does not a bedrock make.87
86. For example, aspirin was used to relieve headaches and fevers long before science
provided any theoretical explanation for its association with these effects.
87. One might argue that evidence-based medicine generalizes directly from large-scale
clinical trials to what works and what does not work without any need for theory as an
intermediary. To some extent this is true, but medical researchers generalizing from treatment
effects have a number of advantages over sociolegal researchers generalizing from social science
research. Evidence-based medical decisions are rooted in studies that are rigorously controlled
and/or involve large populations followed over time. In addition, those studied are, as a group,
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D. Undertheorized Empirics, or Beware the Single Study
More than two decades ago, Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk
published an article in the American Sociological Review exploring the effects
of arrest on recidivist spouse abuse.88 Their work, and the policies that it led to,
indicate the dangers of advocating and adopting policies by generalizing
directly from an empirical study rather than through well-constructed theory.
This is so even when the study is of high quality.
The Sherman and Berk study reports results from a well-designed and
effectively implemented field experiment complemented by sophisticated
statistical evaluation. The researchers persuaded the Minneapolis Police
Department to agree that when police were called to the scene of misdemeanor
spouse abuse they would randomly choose whether to arrest, separate, or
merely lecture those men whose quarrels with wives or girlfriends had
escalated into threatened or actual violence. Outcomes were measured in two
ways: (1) subsequent spouse abuse arrests, and (2) follow-up interviews with
alleged victims to learn if abuse had persisted. Although the outcome measures
were not in perfect accord, they separately indicated that mandatory arrest
(followed by at least a night in jail but usually no further punishment) was
associated with lower recidivism rates than the other experimental treatments.
If ever one social science study might justify policy prescription, this one
seems about as good a candidate as one might find, and it did, in fact, lead to
policy change. The study’s obvious quality, efforts made by Sherman to
publicize its results,89 and the nice fit between the study’s apparent results and

likely to be quite similar in biologically relevant ways to the people, as a group, who will receive
the clinically proven treatments. Clinical trials have misled when the experimental subjects
differed in clinically relevant ways from those later treated, as when trial subjects were almost all
males and women were in the treated population. Moreover, it is a mistake to think that theory
plays no role in evidence-based medicine. Often there will be strong theoretical reasons for
thinking a drug will have certain effects and reasons to believe a treatment will work through
well-understood pathways. The empirical evidence gathering is designed to validate expectations
theory has generated. When theoretical understandings are inadequate there is often, despite
strong experimental designs, a price to be paid. Poorly understood side effects may exist, or a
treatment may not work for, or may even cause harm, to some patients. In the usual instance, the
likelihood of benefit to a user or the costs of not treating will be so high, relative to harmful side
effects or the costs of a failure to treat, that if a treatment is validated in a robust clinical trial it
will be allowed on the market. However, there are medicines that work well for some people but
never are marketed because their untoward effects are prevalent enough and serious enough to
justify withholding the drug from all. With better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms by
which such drugs work, they might be given to those who would benefit from them and kept from
persons they would harm. This realization has spurred genomic medicine.
88. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49
261 (1984). The presentation and discussion of their research
draws heavily on material I presented on the ELS Blog on August 6, 2006. See Lempert, supra
note 14.
89. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal
Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23
117 (1989)
(describing efforts made to publicize the study and the spread of its influence). But see Richard
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the agendas of both the conservative law-and-order movement and the liberal
women’s rights movement combined to make it immediately influential. Police
departments across the country adopted policies in spouse abuse cases of
presumptive or mandatory arrest.
The Sherman and Berk study was, however, as theoretically weak as it
was methodologically strong. Although presented as a study of deterrence
theory, its results were not tightly linked to theory. Beyond presuming
deterrence, no attention was paid to the mechanism by which arrest had its
effects. The authors never examined their data with an eye to understanding
why some men who had been arrested offended again or why some men who
had been randomly assigned to the less drastic treatments nonetheless sinned no
more. Also, the authors never addressed inconsistencies between their measures
of recidivism,90 and they presented but ignored data suggesting that arrest may
have prevented recidivism by disrupting relationships rather than by
discouraging men from abusing women.91
The National Institute of Justice, which had funded the original research
and which was getting great credit for it, then made a decision as valuable and
exemplary as it is rare. They funded five replications. These replications
painted a more nuanced picture than the original study—one with much
murkier policy implications.92 Lawrence Sherman, conducted one of the best
replications. He explored the effects of mandatory arrest in Milwaukee, a city
with a population that was more racially diverse than Minneapolis’s and less
homogenous in terms of socio-economic status.93 The Milwaukee data revealed
that the effects of arrest depended on who was arrested. Men who had a lot to
lose from arrest94 (a group that was disproportionately white, well educated and
with good jobs) seemed to be deterred by arrest in that they were less likely to
offend again than those who received less severe treatments. However, men
with less to lose (a group that was disproportionately poor, black and poorly
employed if they worked at all) became, if anything, more violent toward their
spouses or girlfriends after experiencing arrest.
The simple deterrence hypothesis does not fit the data, but a more
complex understanding of mechanism, consistent with the deterrence
hypotheses and with the results of several of the other replications, offers a
more adequate explanation. Deterrence theory postulates that the greater the

Lempert, Humility is a Virtue: On the Publicization of Policy-Relevant Research, 23
145 (1989).
90. Using one measure, separation was the next most effective treatment to arrest, and
using the other measure, breaking up the fight without separating the parties was next most
effective. Sherman & Berk, supra note 88, at 267.
91. Id.
92. See Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83
1 (1992).
93.
, supra note 7.
94. These losses might be tangible such as a lost job or wages or intangible such as a
debased reputation.
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likely cost of a behavior the less likely it will occur. Since an arrest is
presumably a more costly consequence of police intervention than a separation
or a lecture, one would expect an arrest to most dampen future abuse. The
Milwaukee replication and others suggest, however, that to consider only the
fact of arrest is a mistake. The consequences of an arrest appear contingent on
demographic and other variables, including the period of confinement
following the arrest and the threat of prosecution.95 The contingent nature of an
arrest’s effects clouds rather than simplifies policy recommendations. Do we
want to adopt an arrest policy that might better protect middle class white
women while perhaps endangering women who are lower class and black or
Hispanic?
Moreover, our knowledge of why an arrest seems sometimes to
discourage abuse and sometimes to increase it is still far from complete. It is
easy to understand why fear of arrest would discourage violence, but why
should arrest in some circumstances increase the chance that a man will be a
repeat abuser? One possibility is that arrest creates greater anger than other
treatments and that residual anger, even months after an arrest has occurred,
increases the probability of abuse more than the threat of another arrest
decreases it. Another possibility is that arrest has additional consequences, like
job loss, which strain relationships with spouses and that these strains increase
the likelihood of repeat abuse. Without well-supported theory, this research
cannot tell us how best to respond to spousal abuse of various types, involving
different types of abusers in diverse situations.
The premature influence of the Sherman and Berk study reinforces a core
belief of mine: it is always unwise to base important policy changes on a single
social science study and, in most cases, on a small number of them. No matter
how well done a particular study is, important theoretical gaps will remain, and
filling those gaps is seldom easy. A quarter of a century has passed since
Sherman and Berk’s path-breaking study, and we still lack a theory of what
causes and restrains spousal abuse adequate for policy prescription.96
If it is important to attend to theory in doing and evaluating empirical
research, it is even more important to acknowledge the primacy of theory in
making policy recommendations.97 Theory is what allows us to generalize from
95. In Minneapolis arrested men usually were released after a night in jail and nothing
further happened to them. In Milwaukee men often spent more time in jail and prosecution might
follow.
96. Policy, of course, must be made and implemented whether we fully understand the
policy’s dynamics and context. Moreover, even incomplete theories and scattered studies may
provide a better guide to policy than untutored intuition. I am thus not advocating ignoring social
science research and theories that are only partially grounded. Rather, I am advocating caution in
adopting policies with limited research support even if the research that exists appears impressive.
In particular, being able to point to a study or two that leads in a particular direction will not make
most difficult policy choices easy. Nor should a few studies be treated as trump when their
implications conflict with other values.
97. The idea that if something works in one setting it will work in others is itself a theory,
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a group of empirical studies to the larger universe in which policies are
implemented, and by shedding light on mechanism, a good theory can
distinguish between settings where a policy is likely to work as planned and
settings where it may have no effects or even backfire.
IV
There is, however, also a danger of bending too far in favor of theory. A
strong theory can mislead by unduly shaping perceptions. It may lead us to see
what is not there, or our confidence in theory may be so great that we see no
need for (further) empirical evidence even when gaps in understanding remain.
Some authorities considering mandatory arrest for spousal abuse may not have
asked whether their cities were like Minneapolis because of their faith in
deterrence theory. Legal scholarship is not immune to this phenomenon. Early
scholarship in law and economics is replete with policy recommendations built
on empirically unproven economic theory and little more.98 Rational actor
models were used to predict behavior even though people’s behavior regularly
deviates from rational actor expectations,99 and first best analyses were offered
as models for practical solutions even though it was widely known that more
closely approaching a first best policy is not necessarily the optimum strategy
in a second best world.100 It is, in short, a mistake to think that policymakers
and it is sometimes the only theory offered to justify the leap from empirical study to public policy
or a generalized conclusion. This is not always a mistake. If eating a mushroom kills the first ten
people who try it, we have good reason to believe the eleventh taster will be killed as well, even if
we have no idea why the mushroom is deadly. Similarly, if we were to reliably find that the death
penalty deterred homicides in all states that have it, there is good reason to believe that it would
have a similar effect in the abolitionist states if they changed their laws. But usually, as with the
Sherman and Berk study, there is too great a distance between the conditions of even well done
research and the settings in which its findings might be applied, and too great an interaction
between treatment and context to justify a social policy merely because a particular treatment
worked in a research setting. Before taking the leap from research to action we should understand
theoretically why an effect is expected, or we should be able to conclude from large-scale or
repeat testing that an effect is likely to be invariant across the settings to which we will generalize
results.
98. One classic and still influential example is:
,
(1966). For an early book full of examples, see
,
(1st ed. 1972).
99. See
(Daniel Kahneman et
al, eds. 1982);
,
(1980); Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A
Critique of the Core Premises of “Law and Economics,” 33
274 (1983).
100. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
11 (1956); see also
,
(2008). A first best policy
imagines the optimal solution to a problem and assumes that the closer a policy comes to the
optimal the better the solution is, but in the real world it doesn’t necessarily follow that coming
closer to overall optimality yields better results than more distant solutions. For example suppose
the safest and most efficient parameters for a curve in a highway would be an embankment of
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should choose between reliance on theory and reliance on empirical
investigation. The relationship between empirical research and theories of
behavior is reciprocal. Each offers most when it is informed by and informs the
other. If theory is the foot that I suggest the policy maker set out with, it is at
least as important that the empirical foot also be there to stand on.

Sociology is not physics; neither is political science, psychology,
anthropology, or economics. We may have a good theory of the atom, but there
are no empirically validated general theories of human or organizational
behavior. Most social science theories resist formalization, and where they are
formalized, as is common in economics, they often incorporate empirically
questionable assumptions, meaning their correspondence with what occurs in
the real world is far from perfect. Thus, one can easily criticize social science
theories or even dismiss them entirely. Theory is, however, inescapable in
empirical research, for at every juncture theoretical understandings drive
choice. Moreover, the enterprise of theory building is itself of value. Theory
not only guides research, but it is also a tool for evaluating research designs and
results, and theory is essential if we are to generalize wisely from empirical
results to policy prescription. Theory is, in short, an inescapable part of the
empirical research enterprise, and the enterprise is better for it. As ELS or Law
& Society scholars we must attend to theory to do empirical research well.
Only by working to build theory will we maximize our scientific contributions.

fifteen degrees and a speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour (m.p.h.). We come closer to our ideal
parameters if we have an embankment of twenty-five degrees and a speed limit of sixty-five
m.p.h. than if we have a curve of twenty-five degrees and a speed limit of fifty m.p.h. yet the latter
solution which is more distant from the optimal may be the better one. Or to give a different
example, an unregulated market may lead to the most efficient distribution of goods and services
if the other defining conditions of a free market are present. But in a world where some sellers or
laborers have monopoly power and there are information asymmetries getting closer to the ideal
market by abolishing regulation will lead to worse outcomes than wise regulation.

